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We address the question of whether hedge fund and private equity investments in public firms are motivated 
by corporate governance improvements. As opposed to traditional financial investors both HF and PE are 
likely to have the incentives to alleviate agency conflicts. However, against the background of differences in 
their business models and organizational set ups, it remains an empirical question of whether they address 
the same or different agency conflicts. Studying HF and PE activities in a typical Continental European 
market like Germany promises to offer interesting insights about how HF and PE activities relate to the 
prevalence of family ownership, concentrated ownership structures and conflicts among majority and mi-
nority owners. We document empirical evidence that both HF and PE investments are driven by corporate 
governance improvements, but seem to address different types of agency conflicts. Whereas HF focus on 
firms with a lack of a controlling shareholder, in particular family shareholders, PE invest in firms which 
exhibit the potential to align manager-shareholder interests due to low managerial ownership. Both appear 
to address free cash flow problems differently. Aiming at dividend increases, HF tend use commitment de-
vices that can be implemented over a short horizon. In contrast, PE are inclined to target firms which are 
particularly well-suited for a leverage increase because of low expected financial distress costs. This strate-
gy requires a sufficiently long investment horizon. 
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1  Introduction 
The public equity markets activities of hedge funds (HF) and private equity funds (PE)
1, both belong-
ing to the alternative investment class, increasingly receive media and academic attention. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that they gain influence on managers and interfere with corporate policy. Prominent 
cases include, for example, The Childrens' Investment Fund (TCI) pressuring Deutsche Börse to can-
cel its planned acquisition of the London Stock Exchange and enforcing the resignation of former 
CEO Werner Seifert, or the well-known case of KKR investing in RJR Nabisco, one of the largest PE 
transactions.  
Against the background of their organizational set up and business model both HF and PE are likely 
to have incentives to create shareholder value from agency cost reduction which sets them apart from 
traditional investors. Monitoring incentives are generated by increased effective ownership that stems 
from performance-oriented remuneration for fund managers and usually high use of leverage. Pre-
vious empirical studies reveal a link between their investment decision and the motive of agency cost 
reduction (e.g., for HF Clifford (2007), Brav et al. (2008), Klein and Zur (2009) and for PE, e.g., Op-
ler and Titman (1993), Halpern et al. (1999), Renneboog et al. (2007) or Weir et al. (2005b)). It is an 
empirical question whether they solve the same or different agency conflicts. 
Furthermore, the regulatory debate perceives the high profit orientation and alleged short termism of 
those investors to impair stakeholders’ interests and long term prospects of target firms. Within the 
context of the Proposal for a Directive on Alternative Investment Fund Managers the European Com-
mission considers a new regulation of HF and PE that addresses these concerns among other issues. 
The  European  Commission  acknowledges  that  “a  one  size  fits  all  approach”  is  not  appropriate.
2  
Against this background we investigate the different investment strategies of HF and PE in a typical 
Continental European equity market. An understanding of the drivers of HF and PE investment choic-
es is crucial in order to evaluate whether potential policy measures should address them jointly or 
separately. 
The present paper contributes to the existing literature in two primary respects: (i) with a particular 
focus on agency conflicts the study is the first to directly compare the characteristics of HF and PE 
investment styles in public equity and (ii) it analyzes the interplay of HF and PE investments with the 
distinct features of a Continental European corporate governance system. 
The study of the motives of HF and PE is particularly interesting with respect to Germany. Like many 
Continental European countries, it exhibits a corporate governance system that differs from the An-
glo-Saxon model: weaker protection of minority shareholders (la Porta et al. (1999)), reduced expo-
                                                       
1 We speak of PE in the narrow sense, i.e., later stage investments. The wide sense of PE includes both early 
stage (i.e., venture capital) and later stage investments. 2 
 
sure of managers to hostile takeovers (Franks and Mayer (1998), Loderer and Peyer (2002)) and high 
degree of ownership concentration (Andres (2008)). The first two characteristics imply the potential 
for investors to pursue governance improvement strategies. The third characteristic suggests that due 
to more concentrated ownership structures, agency conflicts might be dominated by conflicts that do 
not exist between shareholders and managers but between large and small shareholders. In this case, 
the investment might be motivated by the intention to discipline large shareholders that extract private 
benefits. Until the late 1990s, ownership structures in Germany were largely characterized by cross-
holdings among major German firms, with banks and insurance companies in the center of the share-
holding network. This system - referred to under the term ``Deutschland AG'' - was criticized of im-
pairing effective corporate governance control. Before the unbundling, corporate control was mainly 
exerted by banks and other corporations via supervisory board representation. The start of activities of 
HF and PE in the German equity market followed shortly after the unbundling of Deutschland AG 
was initiated in the late 1990s. This observation might not be coincidental but may be explained by 
HF and PE aiming at the profitable exploitation of the control vacuum which was generated by the 
unbundling. 
Based on a sample of 96 HF entries and 57 PE entries in German firms between 1998 and 2007, we 
study the HF and PE investment behavior by analyzing the characteristics of target firms using bi-
nomial logistic regressions. Our analysis focuses on agency cost reduction as the main value driver of 
interest. The analysis is restricted to the major intersection of both players, i.e., investments in public-
ly listed firms. Furthermore, the empirical study is limited to the ex-ante target characteristics and 
does not include the consequences of the involvement of financial investors such as share price devel-
opments or changes in the firms’ financials or operations. 
We document empirical evidence that both HF and PE investments are driven by corporate gover-
nance improvements, but seem to address different types of agency conflicts. Whereas HF focus on 
firms with a lack of a controlling shareholder, in particular family shareholders, PE invest in firms 
which exhibit the potential to align manager-shareholder interests due to low managerial ownership. 
Both appear to address free cash flow problems differently. Aiming at dividend increases, HF tend to 
use commitment devices that can be implemented over a short horizon. In contrast, PE are inclined to 
target firms which are particularly well-suited for a leverage increase because of low expected finan-
cial distress costs. This strategy requires a sufficiently long investment horizon. The difference in the 
time horizons over which corporate governance is improved can be traced to the distinct compensa-
tion schemes of HF and PE. 
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 characterizes the distinct business mod-
els of HF and PE and reviews previous literature. We argue that they are expected to solve agency 
problems as opposed to traditional financial investors. Section 3 develops hypotheses about the typi-
cal target characteristics of HF and PE. Section 4 describes the empirical design and comments on 
summary statistics. Subsequently, the empirical results are presented and interpreted in section 5. 
Section 6 concludes. 
2  Comparison of business models and related evidence 
There are several commonalities between HF and PE. Both are privately organized investment firms 
equipped with large capital resources and employing professional fund managers to maximize invest-
ment returns. They are both part of the alternative investment class which is to be distinguished from 
traditional institutional investors such as asset management firms. Generally, their direct client base   
consists of sophisticated investors as opposed to traditional institutional investors. As a consequence, 
they are exempt from several regulatory obligations which usually apply to investment firms. HF and 
PE are, for instance, allowed to strongly link up fund managers' compensation to investment perfor-
mance. Typically, a fund manager's share in his own investment success amounts to 20% of the fund's 
annualized returns (Clifford (2007)). Moreover, due to the reduced degree of regulation, they are al-
lowed to make heavy use of debt financing. This can enhance returns and increase effective owner-
ship. The higher flexibility resulting from the characteristics in terms of incentives for fund managers 
and leverage might enable HF and PE to pursue investment strategies that are not open to traditional 
shareholders. Against this background, improving the corporate governance might be a profitable 
strategy for HF and PE but not for traditional funds. Empirical evidence supports this view by indicat-
ing that traditional asset managers fail in trying to benefit from agency cost reduction (e.g., Gilian and 
Starks (2007)). 
There are substantial differences in the business models of HFs and PE (see Table 1 for a summary). 
HF engage in a variety of asset classes such as commodities, options, futures or foreign exchange of 
which activities related to publicly listed firms only represent one among numerous strategies; in con-
trast to that PE focus their investment activities on equity investments. This difference is then also 
reflected in the personnel pool from which both types recruit their investment professionals. While 
HF mainly recruit employees with financial markets expertise (e.g., from proprietary trading), PE 
additionally recruit personnel with substantial operational expertise, e.g., former management consul-
tants and industrial top managers (Cressy et al. (2007)). These differences in the degree of equity spe-
cialization suggest that PE are likely to have superior abilities in understanding and evaluating the 
target's business and identifying potential levers to improve shareholder value. 
One of the most striking differences is the time horizon of the two types of funds linked up to their 
organizational set-ups. After their initial investment in HF, investors have to wait for an average of 4 
 
ten months before they can withdraw their capital. After this lock-up period, investors have to wait for 
another four months on average until they can take back their invested funds (Agarwal et al. (2009)). 
HF performance is evaluated on a marking to market basis. The fees are determined according to the 
net asset value of the fund periodically, mostly on an annual basis. This implies a relatively short in-
vestment horizon and a preference for liquid securities such that the value can easily be determined 
from observing market prices. Moreover HF investors cannot withdraw capital on an immediate basis 
like in the case of mutual funds, for instance. Instead, there are regular redemption dates at which 
clients can withdraw capital from the fund. In sum, HF prefer holding positions which can be liqui-
dated quickly and at low cost. 
In contrast to HF, which in principle have an infinite life, PE funds are set up for a finite period of on 
average ten years (Sahlman (1990)). During this time, the existing investors cannot withdraw their 
capital and the fund is closed to new investors. This condition is likely to commit PE to maximize the 
fund value over a long horizon. Unlike HF, the fund’s value is not evaluated on a periodical basis, but 
at the end of the holding period, i.e., when all investments are realized. Investors cannot withdraw 
their capital before the final liquidation of the fund. As a consequence, PE are relatively patient inves-
tors and able and willing to hold illiquid assets. These organizational differences are likely to be a key 
determinant of the investment strategies with respect to public equity.  
Previous empirical findings on HF and PE indicate that they successfully act as corporate control 
agents and, hence, create shareholder value. The phenomenon of shareholder activism by HF was 
initially observed in the U.S. in the early 1990s, and there exists a substantial body of empirical work. 
This literature characterizes the activist strategies, their impact on stock returns in the short and long 
run, target characteristics and fundamental changes in the firms subsequent to HF entries (see Table 2 
for an overview). 
Empirical findings suggest that HF usually do not acquire controlling blocks but minority stakes (Brav 
et al. (2008)). This is in line with their short investment horizon as it allows them to exit their invest-
ments quickly and at low cost. In order to gain influence over targets, HF typically make use of share-
holder rights such as requesting board seats or proxy fights. They also use informal ways of attaining 
influence by using the media and publicly articulating their demands. These informal ways are proba-
bly gaining more relevance in the German market. Due to their small share of voting rights, HF have 
to rely on the cooperation or passive support of other shareholders in order to achieve their goals.
3   
                                                       
3 According to U.S. regulation, all investors which purchase a stake or more than 5% in a public firm, have to 
make a 13D filing with the SEC. In this filing, they must report whether they are passive or active investors 
and in the latter case the goals of activism have to be made explicit. This regulatory requirement facilitates the 
analysis of activist HF strategies in the U.S.. In Germany, such regulation is to come in place as part of the 
Risikobegrenzungsgesetz (Risk Limitation Act). 5 
 
The capital market unambiguously appreciates the involvement of HF – upon the announcement of 
HF entries, share prices rise significantly (Brav et al. (2008), Clifford (2007), Klein and Zur (2009), 
Boyson and Mooradian (2007), Greenwood and Schor (2007)). But what constitutes this effect is less 
clear. Clifford (2007) analyzes passive and active HF investments in U.S. equity. He argues that there 
are two explanations for the observation of positive excess returns around the announcement date of 
an HF entry: they can proxy for anticipated value increases due to agency cost reduction or reflect the 
fact that the market attributes superior stock picking abilities to HF. Several studies document that HF 
targets have sound operating profits, large cash holdings, small dividend payments and low growth 
opportunities (Brav et al. (2008), Klein and Zur (2009), Boyson and Mooradian (2007)). Subsequent 
to HF entries, dividend payments and leverage are increased whereas cash holdings are reduced. 
Greenwood and Schor (2007) sketch a less optimistic picture of HF as corporate governance advo-
cates and argue that they are primarily undertaking merger arbitrage. Clifford (2007) argues that if HF 
strategies are restricted to stock picking, then the stated goals should not matter for abnormal returns 
which they do according to the empirical results. 
To the best of our knowledge, there is only one empirical paper studying HF activism for the German 
market. Bessler and Holler (2008) study short and long-term returns subsequent to HF entries in Ger-
many. The authors find that HF have superior skills in identifying undervalued assets and speculating 
in mergers and acquisitions rather than being effective monitors in the long run. In summary, previous 
evidence in the U.S. and Germany indicates that HF follow various strategies when purchasing blocks 
in public equity: they invest in undervalued firms, they act as corporate control agents in mergers and 
acquisitions and they aim at reducing agency costs. 
There are numerous studies on PE in the U.S., fewer in Continental Europe and in particular Germa-
ny. In the following, we will introduce the main findings of a selection of PE literature (see Table 3 
for a short summary). Generally, three approaches are followed in order to identify sources of value 
creation: the cross-section of market reactions to the announcement of PE entries, the cross-section of 
premia paid and target characteristics. Lehn and Poulsen (1989) analyze going private transactions in 
the U.S. and find that the likelihood of being taken private positively depends on free cash flow, prior 
takeover interest and is inversely related to sales growth. The premia paid to existing shareholders are 
driven by large cash holdings and low managerial equity. The authors conclude that PE align incen-
tives between managers and shareholders and reduce agency costs associated with free cash flow. 
Andres et al. (2007) study the market reactions to LBO announcements in Continental Europe. They 
find that the abnormal returns are driven by free float, managerial inefficiency and undervaluation. On 
a country level, their findings suggest that abnormal returns are inversely related to the protection of 
minority shareholders. Apparently, PE are able to resolve monitoring deficits. Opler and Titman’s 
(1993) LBO study finds that the combination of high cash and low growth prospects drives the takeo-6 
 
ver likelihood. High amounts of free cash seem to cause agency problems in firms which do not have 
attractive investment opportunities, as the danger of managers spending cash on inefficient projects is 
more pronounced. Under the assumption that a leverage increase represents an important instrument 
in order to realize the gains from the transactions, firms with high expected financial distress costs are 
unlikely targets. Their empirical findings are consistent with this assumptions: the expected costs of 
financial distress of targets are low as proxied for by R&D spending or selling expenditures. In addi-
tion, Halpern et al. (1999) find that LBO likelihood increases with poor prior stock performance. This 
result suggests that PE target firms are inefficiently managed or suffer from undervaluation by the 
market. In the former case they aim at reducing agency costs and in the latter PE intend to draw value 
from reducing information asymmetries and hence take over a certification function. This result is 
also replicated in the study of Renneboog et al. (2007) on UK transactions. The studies of Weir et al. 
(2005a), Weir et al. (2005b) and Weir et al. (2008) provide further evidence on UK transactions. Weir 
et al. (2005a) and Weir et al. (2005b) find that going private targets are more likely to suffer from 
undervaluation by the market and are likely to have inefficient internal governance mechanisms. Simi-
lar to Opler and Titman (1993), Weir et al. (2008) analyze the role of financial distress costs with 
respect to the going private decision in the UK. According to their findings, UK targets exhibit a high 
asset collateralization and are more diversified.  
To the best of our knowledge, there is only one study analyzing PE investments in the German stock 
market. Achleitner et al. (2009) perform an event study of the announcement of PE investments in 
German. According to their findings, the market reaction is driven by undervaluation, low actual use 
of leverage and the size of tax payments. 
Summing up, both HF and PE are flexible investment firms with high incentives for investment man-
agers. These properties enable them to draw value from corporate governance improvements. It re-
mains an empirical question how fundamental differences in their business models and, in particular, 
their investment horizons are reflected in their pursuit to reduce agency conflicts. 
3  Corporate governance related investment motives 
We argue that HF and PE activities are driven by corporate governance improvements. To test this 
hypothesis and analyze potential differences among HF and PE investment styles, we study target 
characteristics that proxy for the existence of agency conflicts. We focus on two different groups of 
indicators for the potential to reduce agency costs: free cash flow and financial distress as well as 
ownership structure. See Table 4 for a summary. 
3.1  Free cash flow and financial distress  
According to the free cash flow theory (Jensen (1986)), firms with excess cash positions are likely to 
exhibit agency problems. It is argued that cash richness creates opportunities for inefficient invest-7 
 
ment behavior. Managers can use readily available resources to pursue their own interests rather than 
that of their shareholders. Instead of piling up cash, managers should return excess resources to share-
holders via share buybacks, regular or special dividends, if high liquidity is not needed for further 
positive net present value investments. Agency costs stemming from free cash flow are most likely to 
occur in mature and stable businesses with few growth opportunities. If a mature firm needs addition-
al liquid resources, it should address debt or equity markets which would then scrutinize the project's 
efficiency. 
According to da Silva et al. (2004), dividends may be a bonding mechanism and hence a substitute 
corporate governance mechanism to other internal governance mechanisms. A high dividend payment 
forces managers to generate sufficient cash flows and to pursue shareholder value maximization. This 
may reduce the monitoring efforts of the board of directors or shareholders and hence may mitigate 
agency costs arising from financial slack. 
Jensen (1986) argues that debt financing presents another instrument for committing managers not to 
waste cash on potentially inefficient investment projects. Taking on additional debt reduces financial 
slack as managers are bound to use cash from operations to redeem the debt. According to this view, 
debt financing is more binding than dividends, as those can be cut more easily compared to the can-
cellation of debt contracts. Thus, firms with unused debt capacity offer disciplinary potential. Marga-
ritis and Psillaki (2007) offer empirical support for the hypothesis that leverage can serve as a discip-
linary tool to mitigate agency costs of outside ownership and lead to an improvement of efficiency. 
Following Jensen (1986), problems associated with free cash flows are more pronounced in firms that 
do not have attractive growth opportunities. Growing firms need liquid resources for investments 
which is why they have to turn to equity and debt markets on a regular basis. Requesting new capital 
entails a monitoring mechanism, as the investors will scrutinize the investment project prior to the 
supply of capital. As a consequence, large cash positions in growing firms are less likely to create 
managerial discretion. High growth opportunities are also related to information asymmetries (Clarke 
and Shastri (2001)). A mature firm with stable cash flows is less risky, as a substantial part of its prof-
it potential has already materialized. The value of a high-growth firm largely consists of the anticipa-
tion of future profits. Hence, debt financing is more easily obtainable for stable and mature firms, as 
they have more collateralizable assets (Opler and Titman (1993), Weir et al. (2008)). 
Implementing commitment devices that reduce financial slack may have the downside of increasing 
expected financial distress costs as brought forward by Opler and Titman (1993). Therefore, the po-
tential to reduce financial slack is likely to be inversely linked to expected financial distress costs. 
We hypothesize that HF and PE can create value by resolving excess cash positions or establishing 
commitment devices that reduce the free cash flow available at managerial discretion. They can there-
by reduce agency costs stemming from financial slack. To test this hypothesis we analyze the firm's 8 
 
cash position, the actual level of debt financing as a proxy for debt potential, growth perspectives and 
proxies for financial distress such as R&D expenditures and the collateralization of assets. 
3.2  Ownership structure 
Shareholder size and identity are the main determinants of monitoring incentives (Shleifer and Vishny 
(1986), Grossman and Hart (1980)). The lower the shareholders’ incentives to monitor, the more like-
ly will the firm exhibit agency problems. We argue that a firm whose ownership structure fails to re-
duce conflicts between managers and shareholders on the one hand and conflicts between minority 
and majority shareholders on the other hand is likely to become involved with an active investor. We 
hypothesize that HF and PE aim at aligning interests between managers and shareholders and at the 
reduction of private benefits extraction by dominating shareholders. 
Managerial ownership is recognized as an important mechanism to align the interests of owners and 
managers. Empirical evidence documents the success of managerial ownership in reducing agency 
costs (Beiner et al. (2006)). Therefore, the potential to reduce agency costs is likely to be limited in 
the presence of high managerial ownership. 
Family ownership presents a distinct feature of the German equity landscape. This phenomenon is 
less prevalent in Anglo-Saxon markets. There is empirical evidence that family owners are successful 
in dealing with agency conflicts (Andres (2008)). This can be explained by families usually holding a 
large fraction of their wealth invested in the firm. This large and non-diversified exposure generates 
high monitoring incentives. Furthermore, families are generally invested over a long time horizon. 
The knowledge and expertise regarding the firm’s operations as well as the reputation which they 
have built up with other shareholders positively affects their ability to effectively monitor managers.
4  
Ownership concentration represents a further typical feature of the German equity market. Typically, 
ownership structure is considered as an indicator for the monitoring efficiency: manager-shareholder 
conflicts are more likely to be more prevalent in the presence of dispersed ownership. Shleifer and 
Vishny (1986) argue that dispersed ownership may produce a free-riding situation with respect to 
investments in monitoring technologies. A shareholder undertaking monitoring activities bears the 
entire costs while all other shareholders free ride.  
In the U.S., agency problems are claimed to arise predominantly because of dispersed ownership and 
thereby few monitoring incentives. However, due to the high degree of ownership concentration, the 
more relevant conflict in Germany is said not to arise between managers and shareholders but be-
tween large and small shareholders (Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003)). Large shareholders can extract 
                                                       
4 There are also arguments for a negative impact of family shareholders: families are likely to have interests that 
are not necessarily shared by other shareholders such as concerns about the firm's image or reputation and 
debt aversion (Mishra and McConaughy (1999)). 9 
 
private benefits at the expense of the wealth of minority shareholders. Private benefits are defined as 
the extraction of more than proportional rents relative to the size of cash flow rights. 
4  Empirical design and descriptive statistics 
4.1  Methodology and dataset construction 
The main goal of the empirical analysis is to develop an understanding of how target characteristics 
affect the odds of a firm becoming involved with HF or PE. The standard technique used for takeover 
prediction is binomial logistic regression analysis. This model tests the direction and the extent to 
which firm characteristics affect the likelihood of a firm becoming a target. For the construction of the 
control group there is the choice between two sampling procedures: random sampling and matched 
sampling. There are good reasons for and against the use of a matched sample. Several authors argue 
in favor of matching because financial ratios like leverage, operating profitability or investment vo-
lume largely differ across industries, size categories or growth perspectives. Against this background, 
matching  can  make  the  control  group  more  comparable  to  the  target  group  (Song  and  Walkling 
(1993)). There are also compelling arguments against the use of matching (Halpern et al. (1999)). 
First, industry membership, size and growth opportunities are variables of interest for our purposes. 
By using matching it would not be possible to see whether these characteristics make a difference for 
the odds to become a target. Second, there are inaccuracies in the definition of an industry (Clarke 
(1989)) – it is questionable whether industry membership is a meaningful measure. Consequently, 
industry-matching may not necessarily result in obtaining a comparable control sample. In addition, 
there are two pragmatic reasons for the use of a random rather than a matched control sample: as the 
German equity market is relatively small compared to the U.S. market, the number of comparable 
firms is also relatively small and for some targets it would therefore be difficult to obtain a good 
match. Moreover, because the distribution of targets and non-targets across industries is similar in the 
present sample (see Table 5) – the concern regarding overrepresentation of one industry does not ap-
ply to the present case. Empirical evidence (Song and Walkling (1993)) does not find that matching 
significantly changes the test results. Overall, the literature has not come to a final conclusion of 
whether matching is superior or not from a methodological perspective. In this paper, due to the rea-
sons given above, a random control sample is employed. 
As suggested by Halpern et al. (1999), we use a temporal matching procedure in order to account for 
economy-wide influences. Temporal matching is implemented as follows: we randomly select an-
nouncement dates from the target samples in order to determine the dates for the collection of control 
sample data. As a result, the distribution of control firms over time broadly resembles that of target 
firms (see Table 6). 
The dataset underlying the present empirical analysis comprises 96 HF targets, 57 PE targets and 96 
non-targets serving as control firms. The HF sample has been collected from a database provided by 10 
 
the Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin), the German Financial Supervisory Au-
thority. The database comprises all reported shareholdings according to § 21 of the German Securities 
Trading Act. According to § 21, an institution or person has to report his shareholding to BaFin and 
the issuer if it exceeds or falls below certain threshold values of 3%, 5%, 10%, 25%, 50% or 75%. 
BaFin and the issuing firm then publicize this information. The database lists the underlying share, the 
reporting date of the transaction, the identity of the shareholder, his location of incorporation and the 
fraction of shares held after the respective transaction. The BaFin database includes the name of the 
investor but no information about his type, i.e., whether the reporting institution is an HF, mutual 
fund, industrial firm, individual etc. Hence, further work is required in order to identify those HF that 
acquire visible stakes in publicly listed firms. The fact that there is no legal definition of an HF fur-
ther complicates the identification of HF investments. We proceed as follows: the entire database is 
screened for reporting institutions that are neither individuals nor industrial firms nor banks or insur-
ance companies. Each remaining reporting institution is then checked for being an HF using Factiva, 
LexisNexis, Google and investor magazines. In order to qualify as HF, the institution has to fulfill one 
of the following criteria: (i) being classified as HF in the financial press or an investor magazine or 
(ii) defining themselves as HF on their webpage. Several traditional asset managers like UBS have set 
up funds whose investment strategies resemble those of HF, e.g., by the use of derivatives. It is not 
possible to distinguish whether the financial institution holds the equity stake as part of their HF or 
traditional business. We exclude those ambiguous cases. Furthermore, only the first entries of HF into 
a firm are included in the sample. The relevant entry dates have been cross-checked with the financial 
press as BaFin reports usually entail a considerable time lag. 
The PE sample is collected with the help of the Merger Market database. Among other transactions, 
Merger Market provides information on PE investing in German equity. Targets in the financial sector 
were excluded from both the HF and PE sample for the following reasons: (i) financial statements are 
difficult to be compared to the statements of industrial firms and (ii) there may be other motivations 
for these investments like strategic co-operations with the targets. 
96 control firms were randomly selected from CDAX firms excluding all HF and PE targets as well as 
financial firms. Firm data for the control sample was chosen from the entry years of the targets in 
order to avoid biases due to potential macro-wide influences particular to a certain year. The exact 
dates were randomly chosen from the target sample. In order to avoid a potential survivorship bias, we 
randomly chose firms from the CDAX list of the respective year. Accounting information on the firm 
level refers to the figures in the fiscal year before the announcement of investor entry. 
4.2  Summary statistics 
PE started to become involved with German publicly listed firms in 1998 (see Table 6). 2005 exhibits 
the highest number of entries with 13 investments. HF assumed their German activities with a lag: the 11 
 
first HF investment detectable by the sample selection procedure described below was observed in 
2001. Nearly 90% of all the entries were observed between 2005 and 2007, with a peak of 40% of all 
HF events in 2007. This difference in distribution over time requires temporal matching as discussed 
in the methodology section. In the U.S., there was a PE as early as the 1980s. HF investments in the 
U.S. have been observed since the mid-1990s. The time lag with respect to Germany can be first attri-
buted to the fact that most HF and PE are U.S.-based firms and test their strategies in their domestic 
market before competition makes them expand internationally. Second, the German market became 
more attractive for foreign investors due to the ‘unbundling of the Deutschland AG' (Bessler and Hol-
ler (2008)) and the concomitant re-orientation of how German firms should be governed. It was ar-
gued that the complex cross-shareholdings and the mutual control of supervisory boards among Ger-
man corporations impaired effective corporate governance control. Discussions in the late 1990s on 
the need for action resulted in the enactment of a new law which allows corporations to sell their eq-
uity stakes in other firms tax-exempt. Following the new tax rule, many key players in the center of 
Deutschland AG such as Deutsche Bank AG, Allianz AG or Münchener Rück AG committed to sell 
their numerous equity stakes. The coincidence of the unbundling and the start of HF and PE activities 
could be interpreted as the re-orientation generating the potential for investment strategies aimed at 
the improvement of corporate governance. 
In 2007, there were only three publicly announced PE transactions, all of which occurred in the first 
half of the year. This could be traced to the subprime crisis which started in mid-2007 and made it 
difficult to obtain debt financing at attractive terms. 
Table 5 shows the distribution of target and non-target firms across industries. Overall, the distribu-
tion across industries exhibits weak patterns, but there is no clear overrepresentation of one or more 
industries. HF investments are most commonly observed in the following industries: industrial, soft-
ware and media. The most common sectors of PE targets are consumer goods, industrials and soft-
ware. There are noticeable differences between HF and PE in the following industries: pharma & 
healthcare (rather preferred by HF) and consumer goods (rather preferred by PE). This difference may 
reflect the general preference of PE to invest in stable businesses that exhibit a low degree of uncer-
tainty. The distribution of the financial investor targets grossly resembles the industry distribution of 
the firms randomly selected from CDAX. 
HF and PE targets significantly differ with respect to the size of the acquired stakes (see Table 7). PE 
hold much more concentrated positions relative to HF when looking at the euro volume of the stakes. 
Consistent with the statement in section 2, HF investors almost always (95.8%) acquire minority 
stakes. We can only observe three cases in which HF acquire a controlling stake, i.e., a stake in excess 
of 25%. All HF stakes remain below the threshold of 30% which triggers a mandatory takeover offer 
according to § 29 and § 35 of the German Securities Acquisition and Takeover Act. In contrast, PE 12 
 
acquire controlling stakes in 91.2% of the events. 80.7% of the stakes are above the mandatory takeo-
ver threshold of 30%. In more than half of the cases, PE acquire more than 75%. This finding is con-
sistent with the initial assumptions that PE aim at full control whereas HF intend to induce only small 
changes. The threshold of 75% is relevant under the assumption that PE aim at increasing leverage, 
because it enables PE to set up a control and profit transfer agreement according to § 291 of the Ger-
man Securities Act which is likely to improve the financing terms for the transaction. Nearly half of 
the PE targets in our sample have been delisted subsequent to PE entry. With respect to HF, the de-
listed targets only account for 10% of the sample. 
Table 8 summarizes the descriptive statistics of target and non-target firms and Table 9 shows the 
correlations among the variables. The univariate results suggest that HF targets differ significantly 
from PE targets. The ownership structure summary statistics suggest that HF target firms with large 
free float. This may be due to marginal control of their small stakes being higher with increasing free 
float and also their preference for holding liquid positions which can be sold quickly and at low cost. 
Large positions could not be exited as easily since they would usually cause a considerable price im-
pact. As opposed to the evidence on the U.S. market (Klein and Zur (2009)), we do not find any sup-
port for the hypothesis that target size is particularly small in comparison to randomly selected CDAX 
firms. However, only 14% of PE targets and 19.8% of HF targets are members of the HDAX. HDAX 
membership is expected to be positively related to market visibility and accordingly inversely with 
information asymmetry. 
5  Empirical results 
In the following we use binomial logistic regressions to analyze the investment motives in a multiva-
riate context. We employ several additional variables in order to control for alternative investment 
motives that are not necessarily associated with corporate governance improvements but may yet 
drive the investment decisions. 
5.1  HF investment motives 
Table 10 shows the regression result for the HF investment motives. We find support for the hypothe-
sis that HF aim at reducing agency costs stemming from free cash flow. The dividend yield is inverse-
ly related to the odds of becoming an HF target: in all models, the negative coefficient is significant at 
the 5% level. This can be interpreted as support for the hypothesis that HF push to raise dividends. 
However, the observation of a low dividend yield could be attributed to the construction of the meas-
ure: HF invest in growth firms and, as the market value of equity is in the denominator of the dividend 
yield measure, the measure is very small. This suggests that there may be a negative relationship be-
tween dividend payout and HF targets because growth firms per se do not pay out much and rather 
prefer to reinvest the cash from operations into the expansion of their businesses. If this were the case, 
then the conclusion that HF aim at pushing for dividend increases would be inappropriate. This objec-13 
 
tion cannot be upheld because by including Q in the regression, we already control for growth pers-
pectives. Additionally, the results remain robust with respect to the use of the retention rate defined as 
(1-cash dividend)/EBITDA and 0  if dividends are larger than EBITDA.  
Buybacks represent an alternative to return cash. The results above might be subject to the omitted 
variable bias: if HF targets are of such a type as to prefer buybacks over dividends, it would be inap-
propriate to classify them as firms with low cash payouts. The results remain robust if we use a dum-
my variable for the announcement or the proceeding of share buybacks in the two years prior to HF 
entry. Even in terms of buybacks, HF targets distribute significantly less cash to shareholders. 
We do not find any evidence for the hypothesis that HF aim at investing in firms with the intention of 
making them pay out excess cash. The insignificance of cash holdings is still maintained when testing 
for several modified cash proxies such as cash scaled by market value, the absolute size of cash and 
several interaction terms with growth perspectives. Accordingly, the prominent case of TCI urging 
Deutsche Börse to return cash to shareholders does not seem to be representative. Moreover, HF tar-
gets do not seem to be underleveraged. Quite the reverse: HF targets have slightly more net debt. 
Moreover, Tobin's Q significantly and positively affects the likelihood of HF entry. As Tobin's Q is 
positively linked to the costs of financial distress, this suggests that HF targets do not have debt poten-
tial. 
The positive and significant coefficient of the R&D measure provides further evidence of HF targets 
not being likely to have debt capacity under the assumption that R&D is a proxy for expected costs of 
financial distress. Overall, the claim that HF invest in firms in order to burden them with additional 
debt is not supported by the empirical results. This observation is consistent with the view that HF do 
not seek a financial turnaround of the target. The positive influence of R&D on the odds of becoming 
an HF target appears puzzling. Investors with operational expertise have the ability to evaluate the 
efficiency of R&D projects. R&D is acknowledged as a proxy for information asymmetry due to the 
high technical complexity of the firm's business. R&D projects are usually unique and their outcomes 
highly uncertain. These features make it difficult for market participants to value the firm (Aboody 
and Lev (2000)). Chan et al. (2001) find empirical support for the claim that the market has difficul-
ties in sufficiently appreciating the value of R&D projects. Investors with operational expertise could 
invest in undervalued R&D firms and thereby make other market participants aware of the undervalu-
ation. Furthermore, it could be argued that investors that are skilled with respect to R&D could cut 
inefficient R&D and thereby increase shareholder value. Against the background of HF not being 
equipped with operational expertise, these investment motives are unlikely. However, there exists an 
alternative explanation: free cash flow is highly sensitive to R&D expenditures. HF could call for cuts 
in R&D, in order to increase free cash flow which could result in a higher valuation by analysts. This 
strategy would also be in line with the short investment horizon of HF. Cuts in R&D could have ad-14 
 
verse  effects  on  shareholder  value  in  the  long  run.  Further empirical investigation on the conse-
quences of HF investment is required for a more comprehensive understanding of the role of R&D. 
In general, the positive relationship between financial distress proxies such as R&D and Tobin’s Q 
could be traced to the HF preference for rather risky investments that is due to their compensation 
structure: higher risk enables them to generate large returns over a short horizon.  Family ownership is 
inversely related to the likelihood of becoming an HF target. Empirical evidence in Germany (Andres 
(2008)) suggests that families solve agency conflicts successfully. As a consequence, the negative 
impact of family ownership on HF investment can be interpreted as support for the incentive align-
ment hypothesis. With respect to management ownership the empirical results do not establish a sig-
nificant effect on the odds of becoming an HF target. The management coefficient is negative but fails 
to be statistically significant. Model 2 includes free float as a control variable and indicates that HF 
prefer to invest in firms with large free float, which may be due to higher liquidity and higher margin-
al control. This finding is also in line with the assumption that HF only assume a monitoring function 
if there is little control over the management in place. 
In order to test the private benefits hypotheses, we need to empirically disentangle the degree of own-
ership concentration and private benefits. In general, these variables should be correlated to a certain 
degree, as the potential for private benefits extraction presupposes the existence of a dominant share-
holder which is positively associated with ownership concentration. For the empirical test of the pri-
vate benefits hypothesis, several authors (e.g., Achleitner et al. (2009)) employ the size of the second 
largest shareholder. The size of the second largest shareholder is considered a proxy for his power and 
his ability to prevent the largest shareholder from extracting private benefits. A more comprehensive 
measure should account for the difference in power between the largest and the second largest share-
holder and thus reflect an interaction between the two variables. Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003) propose 
the following measure: if the second largest shareholder owns less than 5% of shares, they label this 
firm as “unchecked”, meaning that there is no other powerful shareholder which can reduce the pri-
vate benefits extraction of the largest shareholder. The authors suggest that the private benefits poten-
tial is even greater if there is a controlling shareholder (i.e., a shareholder who owns more than 25%) 
and the firm is unchecked. In line with these authors, we construct the following dummy variable. 
Private benefits is set equal to 1 if there is a controlling shareholder and the second largest stake is 
smaller than 5%. As robustness checks, we additionally include continuous variables to test for the 
potential power of the largest shareholder to extract private rents: we use the ratio of the largest to the 
second largest stake as well as their difference. 
According to the empirical results, HF eschew firms with potential private benefits issues: the private 
benefits variable has a negative coefficient with statistical significance at the 1% level. This finding is 
robust with respect to the use of various alternative proxies and provides clear evidence that HF do 15 
 
not aim at the reduction of private benefits problems. They do not build up a sufficiently large stake to 
control or outvote the dominating shareholder. 
In the third model, we include several control variables to account for potential alternative investment 
motives. The involvement of a firm with mergers and acquisitions significantly affects the odds of 
becoming an HF target as suggested by the positive and significant coefficients of the acquisition and 
target variables. Speculation in mergers and acquisitions can be profitable: investing potential acquir-
ers is attractive if HF successfully conjecture the settlement or the cancellation of the planned acquisi-
tion. The investment in potential targets can reflect the HF's belief that the takeover bid will be in-
creased. 
Alternatively, this can be interpreted as HF being active in corporate control and investing in acquir-
ers because they want to prevent management from a potentially inefficient acquisition or in takeover 
targets in order to make reluctant managers agree to the takeover. Given the present data, it is not 
possible to distinguish between the merger arbitrage and the corporate control hypothesis. The ex-post 
information about the success of the alleged merger is not sufficient in order to assess whether HF are 
passive merger arbitrageurs or active corporate control agents. E.g., if a target is finally being taken 
over, we cannot be sure whether this is due to the HF or not. Concrete information about potential HF 
interference is difficult to obtain from publicly available data because much of the influence happens 
behind the scenes. This gap could be filled by a survey approach. 
We perform further robustness checks using prior stock performance and size as control variables. 
The results do not yield any evidence that HF invest in firms that suffer from poor prior stock perfor-
mance. Under the efficient market hypothesis, a poor prior stock performance would indicate mana-
gerial inefficiency. Thus, in terms of prior stock performance, HF do not seem to seek an operational 
turnaround of unprofitable firms. We do not find indications for HF investing in undervalued firms as 
measured by poor prior stock performance under relaxation of the efficient market assumption. Size is 
generally acknowledged as a proxy for information asymmetry (Frankel and Li (2004)). Small firms 
receive less attention by capital markets (e.g., Renneboog et al. (2007)). In particular, small firms are 
less interesting investment objects for traditional institutional investors because of the existence of 
minimum investment sizes for these investors. As a consequence, there is little trading activity in the 
shares of small firms which decreases the information content of the share price. Testing size as a 
proxy for information asymmetry, we cannot find any evidence that HF target small firms. The strate-
gy of investment in undervalued securities due to information asymmetry does not seem to be a repre-
sentative investment motive of HF. 
In a nutshell, the empirical results indicate that HF investments are related to corporate governance 
improvements: they seem to aim at the reduction of agency problems associated with free cash flow 16 
 
by dividend increases. Furthermore, they appear to align incentives by investing in firms whose own-
ership structure does not generate high monitoring incentives. 
5.2  PE investment motives 
Table 11 shows the results that compare the characteristics of PE targets and non-targets. In contrast 
to other studies (e.g., Opler and Titman (1993)), we do not find that PE targets are cash rich. The cash 
variable and also interaction terms of cash and growth (not reported here) are insignificant. Further-
more, the empirical results do not document that PE targets are underleveraged. The coefficient of the 
debt variable fails to be significant. The coefficient of q is negative but not statistically significant 
which indicates that PE targets do not have substantially low growth opportunities. However, we do 
find alternative support for the hypothesis that targets feature characteristics which make them attrac-
tive for an increase in leverage. R&D as a proxy for expected financial distress costs is significantly 
inversely associated with the odds of PE entry. R&D expenditures are significantly inversely related 
to the odds of a firm becoming subject to PE investment. Previous studies (e.g., Lichtenberg and Sie-
gel (1990)) document that PE implement higher operational efficiency. PE’s superior industry exper-
tise could enable them to evaluate the efficiency of R&D projects. According to the empirical findings 
of Sorensen et al. (2008), PE increase the efficiency of patents in non-listed companies. However, the 
negative sign of the R&D variable suggests that the motive of cutting R&D expenditures, as part of 
operational engineering aimed at shareholder value maximization is unlikely. The financial distress 
aspect seems to be dominating.  
The significant and negative coefficient of risk suggests that PE targets in our sample have stable 
earnings. This feature also indicates low financial distress costs and thus makes them attractive for 
leverage increases. Overall, we find hints for the potential of PE target firms to increase the use of 
debt financing which potentially reduces agency costs associated with free cash flow. Compared to 
HF, PE seem to address free cash flow problems more fundamentally. Whereas dividend increases can 
be effectuated over a short horizon, debt restructurings require a longer time horizon and can also not 
be reversed quickly.  
Furthermore, the results document support for the hypothesis that PE create value from incentive 
alignment. PE invest in firms with low prior managerial equity. Apparently, PE aim at aligning inter-
ests of managers and shareholders. Managerial incentives can be aligned by compensation contracts 
that are strongly linked to firm performance. Changes in compensation structures are difficult to be 
implemented on an ad-hoc basis and are therefore consistent with the longer investment horizon of 
PE. Moreover, establishing a more performance oriented managerial compensation is likely to require 
substantial industry expertise which is also more likely to be found with PE. 
In robustness checks, we control for a potential non-monotonic relationship testing the square of ma-
nagerial ownership. Several authors (e.g., Morck et al. (1988)) argue that larger managerial stakes 17 
 
lead to managerial entrenchment rather than alignment of interest. However, the present results do not 
establish a significant relationship between the odds of becoming a PE target and the square of mana-
gerial shareholdings. Further empirical results of Weir et al. (2005b) document additional support for 
the undervaluation hypothesis: targets are significantly younger, smaller and have poor prior stock 
performance. We do not find any support for the undervaluation hypothesis in terms of these va-
riables. In contrast to the findings of Weir et al. (2005b) who analyze UK targets the incentive and 
undervaluation effects do not explain PE investment choices in Germany.  
In terms of family shareholdings, we do not find evidence that PE avoid firms with low family stakes. 
The family coefficient is insignificant but positive. At first glance, this presents a contradiction to the 
initial hypothesis, as it was assumed that family ownership is negatively related to agency problems. 
A potential explanation might be the ability of PE to serve as a successor of large shareholders. Based 
on a survey among PE and family firms, Achleitner et al. (2008) find that when contemplating an exit, 
families may prefer selling their stakes to PE because of a higher selling price and the general aver-
sion of families to sell their business to a competitor. This result is also consistent with the hypothesis 
that PE aim at reaching irrevocable commitments to increase the success probability of the transaction 
and reduce acquisition costs.  
The empirical results suggest that PE entry is not driven by private benefits if we use the ‘unchecked’ 
proxy. For the private benefits reduction strategy to be profitable, an investor has to build a ``counter-
stake'' to the dominating and rent-extracting shareholder. The dominating shareholder who extracts 
private benefits only tenders his stake to PE if the offer price compensates him for the loss of private 
benefits. As a consequence, buying out shareholders that are extracting private benefits is an unprofit-
able strategy. Based on information from the BaFin database and financial press, we exclude all the 
cases in which PE purchase the stake from the dominating shareholder. Those cases make up for 
about one third of the sample (18 targets). We hypothesize that, if anything, the reduction of private 
benefits could only be profitable in those cases. The results from model 2 show that private benefits 
are unlikely to drive PE investments, because the coefficient of the private benefits proxy still fails to 
be significant. The explanatory power of this model specification is very limited: the Chi-square test 
rejects the hypothesis that all tested variables are jointly insignificant only at the 10% level. 
We control for various alternative investment motives. Increasing leverage may also be attractive be-
cause of tax benefits. Model 3 tests for the significance of the tax variable. The coefficient is opposite 
to the hypothesized direction and insignificant. This finding is replicated when using tax expenses 
divided by the market value of equity as an alternative measure. Hence, we do not find any support for 
PE targets having high tax liabilities. This finding is in line with the results of Weir et al. (2005b) and 
Weir et al. (2008) who do not find that high tax liabilities significantly increase the likelihood of PE 
investment in the UK. The value drivers of PE activities in Germany seem to stem from sources other 18 
 
than tax arbitrage. This finding is not necessarily inconsistent with the results of Achleitner et al. 
(2009), who find that the market reaction to PE entries is driven by tax motives: an increased use of a 
debt tax shield may indeed increase shareholder wealth, but still the tax advantage does not represent 
an original investment motive. 
Size and prior stock performance fail to be significantly related to the likelihood of PE entries. Both 
variables are related to information asymmetries. Hence, the reduction of information asymmetries 
does not seem to motivate PE investments. 
In sum, PE strategies are characterized as follows: with stable cash flows and little R&D, PE targets 
are particularly well-suited for increases in leverage. Moreover, they invest in firms which are likely 
to exhibit agency costs due to low managerial equity and, hence, large degree of ownership-control 
separation. 
6  Concluding remarks 
The present paper analyzes HF and PE target characteristics in order to investigate whether their in-
vestment strategies are driven by corporate governance improvements. Summing up, the findings in-
dicate that the investment motives of HF and PE are both linked to free cash flow problems and incen-
tive alignment potential. However, they pursue distinct investment strategies which can be explained 
by their particular business models. 
HF acquire minority stakes in public companies. They are likely to aim at dividend increases and the-
reby mitigate free cash flow problems. Moreover, HF investment seems to be motivated by monitor-
ing deficits: focus on firms with a lack of controlling shareholders, in particular a lack of family own-
ership.  
In contrast, PE mostly acquire controlling stakes and aim at taking the target private accompanied by 
an increase in leverage. PE targets are well-suited for leverage increases because they are likely to 
have low expected financial distress costs. PE also appear to draw value from incentive alignment by 
targeting firms with low managerial shareholdings. Neither HF nor PE seem to be motivated by the 
reduction of private benefits.  
In summary, our findings indicate that HF implement measures which mitigate agency problems and 
hence create wealth in the short run. PE mitigate agency problems and hence create wealth in the long 
run. These findings are consistent with the organizational set ups of HF and PE which imply joint 
incentives to improve corporate governance but differences in the time horizons and depth of changes 
that can be implemented. 
The findings that HF and PE activities are driven by corporate governance improvements suggest a 
positive role from a welfare perspective. However, in the following respects, HF and PE may be de-
trimental to long-term welfare: HF strategies aim at creating shareholder value in the short run which 19 
 
may come at the expense of the long run shareholder value if one assumes that markets are not effi-
cient. Increasing leverage seems to be an important driver of the PE investment decision. The poten-
tial wealth transfer from stakeholders, in particular debtholders and employees, seems to be the most 
likely problem with respect to PE. A more comprehensive assessment therefore necessitates the analy-





















Aboody,  D.  and  B.  Lev  (2000),  ‘Information  Asymmetry,  R&D,  and  Insider  Gain’,  Journal  of 
Finance, Vol. 55, No. 1 (February), pp. 2747–2766. 
Achleitner, A.-K., C. Andres, A. Betzer and C. Weir (2009), ‘Wealth effects of Private Equity In-
vestments on the German Stock Market’, European Journal of Finance, forthcoming. 
Achleitner, A.-K., S.C. Schraml and F. Tappeiner (2008), ‘Private Equity Minority Investments in 
Large Family Firms: What are the Decision Criteria of the Family Owner?’, Discussion Paper (Center 
for Entrepreneurial and Financial Studies (CEFS), Technical University of Munich). 
Agarwal, V., N.D. Daniel and N.Y. Naik (2009), ‘Role of Managerial Incentives and Discretion in 
Hedge Fund Performance’, Journal of Finance, forthcoming. 
Andres, C. (2008), ‘Large Shareholders and Firm Performance – an Empirical Examination of Found-
ing-Family Ownership’, Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 14, No. 4 (September), pp. 431–445. 
Andres, C., A. Betzer and C. Weir (2007), ‘Shareholder Wealth Gains Through Better Corporate Go-
vernance - The Case of European LBO Transactions’, Financial Markets and Portfolio Management, 
Vol. 21, No. 4 (December), pp. 403–424. 
Beiner, S., W. Drobetz, M. Schmid and H. Zimmermann (2006), ‘An Integrated Framework of Corpo-
rate Governance and Firm Valuation’, European Financial Management, Vol. 12, No. 2 (March), pp. 
249–283. 
Bessler, W. and J. Holler (2008), ‘Capital Markets and Corporate Control: Empirical Evidence from 
Hedge Fund Activism in Germany’, Discussion Paper (Justus-Liebig University Giessen). 
Bevilacqua, J. (2006), 'Convergence and Divergence: Blurring the Lines Between Hedge Funds and 
Private Equity Funds', Buffalo Law Review, Vol. 54, pp. 101–127. 
Boyson, N.M. and R.M. Mooradian (2007), ‘Hedge Funds as Shareholder Activists from 1994 – 
2005’, Discussion Paper (Northeastern University). 
Brav, A., W. Jiang, F. Partnoy and R. Thomas (2008), ‘Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance 
and Firm Performance’, Journal of Finance, Vol. 63, No. 4 (August), pp. 1729–1775. 
Chan, L.K.C., J. Lakonishok and T. Sougiannis (2001), ‘The Stock Market Valuation of Research and 
Development Expenditures’, Journal of Finance, Vol. 56, No. 4 (August), pp. 2431–2456. 
Clarke, J. and K. Shastri (2001), ‘On Information Asymmetry Metrics’, Discussion Paper (Georgia 
Institute of Technology). 
Clarke, R.N. (1989), ‘SICs as Delineators of Economic Markets’, Journal of Business, Vol. 62, No. 1 
(January), pp. 17–32. 21 
 
Clifford, C. (2007), ‘Value Creation or Destruction? Hedge Funds as Shareholder Activists’, Journal 
of Corporate Finance, Vol. 14, No. 4 (September), pp. 323–336.. 
Cressy, R., F. Munari and A. Malipiero (2007), ‘Playing to their Strength? Evidence that Specializa-
tion in the Private Equity Industry Confers Competitive Advantage’, Journal of Corporate Finance, 
Vol. 13, No. 4 (September), pp. 647–669. 
Da Silva, L.C., M. Goergen and L. Renneboog (2004), ‘Dividend Policy and Corporate Governance‘, 
Oxford University Press. 
European Commission (2009), ‘Proposal for a Directive on Alternative Investment Fund Managers’, 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/investment/alternative_investments_en.htm.  
Frankel, R. and X. Li (2004), ‘Characteristics of a Firm's Information Environment and the Informa-
tion Asymmetry between Insiders and Outsiders’, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 37, No. 
2 (June), pp. 229–259. 
Franks, J. and C. Mayer (1998), ‘Bank Control, Takeovers and Corporate Governance in Germany’, 
Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 22, No. 10 (October), pp. 1385–1403. 
Gilian, S. and L. Starks (2007), ‘The Evolution of Shareholder Activism in the United States’, Journal 
of Applied Corporate Finance, Vol. 10/19, No. 1 (Winter), pp. 55–73. 
Greenwood, R. and M. Schor (2007), ‘Hedge Fund Investor Activism and Takeovers’, Discussion 
Paper (Harvard University). 
Grossman, S.J. and O.D. Hart (1980), ‘Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the 
Corporation’, Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Spring), pp. 42–64. 
Gugler, K. and B.B. Yurtoglu (2003), ‘Corporate Governance and Dividend Pay-out Policy in Germa-
ny’, European Economic Review, Vol. 47, No. 4 (August), pp. 731–758. 
Halpern, P., R. Kieschnick and W. Rotenberg (1999), ‘On the Heterogeneity of Leveraged Going Pri-
vate Transactions’, Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Summer), pp. 281–309. 
Jensen, M.C. (1986), ‘Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and Takeovers’, American 
Economic Review, Vol. 76, No. 2 (May), pp. 59–75. 
Kaserer, C., A.-K. Achleitner, C. von Einem and D. Schiereck (2007), ‘Private Equity in Deutschland, 
Rahmenbedingungen, ökonomische Bedeutung und Handlungsempfehlungen’, (Books on Demand). 
Klein, A. and E. Zur (2009), ‘Entrepreneurial Shareholder Activism: Hedge Funds and Other Private 
Investors’, Journal of Finance, forthcoming. 
La Porta, R., F. Lopes-de-Silanes and A. Shleifer (1999), ‘Corporate Ownership around the World’, 
Journal of Finance, Vol. 54, No. 2 (April), pp. 471–517. 
Lehn, K. and A. Poulsen (1989), ‘Free Cash Flow and Stockholder Gains in Going Private Transac-
tions’, Journal of Finance, Vol. 44, No. 3 (July), pp. 771–787. 22 
 
Lichtenberg, F.R. and D. Siegel (1990), ‘The Effects of Leveraged Buyouts on Productivity and Re-
lated Aspects of Firm Behavior’, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 27, No. 1 (September), pp. 
165–194. 
Loderer, C. and U. Peyer (2002), ‘Board Overlap, Seat accumulation and Share Prices’, European 
Financial Management, Vol. 8, No. 2 (June), pp. 165–192. 
Margaritis, D. and M. Psillaki (2007), ‘Capital Structure and Firm Efficiency’, Journal of Business 
Finance & Accounting, Vol. 34, Nos. 9&10 (November-December), pp. 1447–1469. 
Mishra, C.S. and D.L. McConaughy (1999), ‘Founding Family Control and Capital Structure: The 
Risk of Loss of Control and the Aversion to Debt’, Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, Vol. 23, 
pp. 53–64. 
Morck, R., A. Shleifer and R.W. Vishny (1988), ‘Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An 
Empirical Analysis’, Journal of Finance, Vol. 20, Nos. 1&2 (January), pp. 293–315. 
Opler, T.C. and S. Titman (1993), ‘The Determinants of Leveraged Buyout Activity: Free Cash Flow 
vs. Distressed Debt Costs’, Journal of Finance, Vol. 48, No. 5 (December), pp. 1985–1999. 
Renneboog, L., T. Simons and M. Wright (2007), ‘Why Do Public Firms Go Private in the UK? The 
Impact of Private Equity Investors, Incentive Realignment and Undervaluation’, Journal of Corporate 
Finance, Vol. 13, No. 4 (September), pp. 591–628. 
Sahlman, W.A. (1990), ‘The Structure and Governance of Venture Capital Organizations’, Journal of 
Financial Economics, Vol. 27, No. 2 (October), pp. 473–521. 
Shleifer, A. and R.W. Vishny (1986), ‘Large Shareholders and Corporate Control’, Journal of Politi-
cal Economy, Vol. 94, No. 3 (June), pp. 461–488. 
Song, M. and R. Walkling (1993), ‘The Impact of Managerial Ownership on Acquisition Attempts 
and Target Shareholder Wealth’, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 38/28, pp. 439–
457. 
Sorensen, M., P. Strömberg and J. Lerner (2008), ‘Private Equity and Long-Run Investment: The Case 
of Innovation’, Discussion Paper. 
Weir, C.M., D. Laing and M. Wright (2005a), ‘Undervaluation, Private information, Agency Costs 
and the Decision to Go Private’, Applied Financial Economics, Vol. 15, No. 13 (September), pp. 947–
961. 
Weir, C., D. Laing and M. Wright (2005b), ‘Incentive Effects, Monitoring Mechanisms and the Mar-
ket for Corporate Control: An Analysis of the Factors Affecting Public to Private Transactions in the 
UK’, Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Vol. 32, Nos. 5&6, pp. 909–943. 
Weir, C., M. Wright and L. Scholes (2008), ‘Public-to-Private Buy-Outs, Distress Costs and Private 







Table 1: Generic characteristics of HF and PE 









Variety  of  financial  Instruments: 
e.g., public equity, fixed income, 
options, futures, convertible secu-
rities, commodities 
Public and private equity 
Expertise  Focus on Financial  Both financial and industrial 
Investment horizon  Average initial lock up period of 
10 months 
Average period of 10 years 
Performance based compensation  High  High 
Determination of Performance  Periodically, based on the net 
asset value of the portfolio via 
marking to market 
At liquidation, based on the final 
cash flow from the investment port-
folio 
Redemption  On a periodic basis  At liquidation 
Admittance of new Investors  On a periodic basis  No 
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Table 2: Overview HF literature 
Authors  Region  Horizon  Short term event study  Long  term  event 
Study 
Target characteristics  Changes 
Brav et al. 
(2008) 
U.S.  2001 – 
2006 
Positive abnormal re-
turns driven by requests 
to spin-off assets or sell 
the firm 
No reversal of the 
positive announce-
ment effects in subse-
quent year 
Low market to book ration, sound operating prof-
itability, low R&D, low dividend, more takeover 
defenses, higher CEO pay, slightly higher lever-
age, more diversified 
Increase in Operating performance, 
slight increase in leverage, decline in 




U.S.  1998 – 
2005 
Positive effects, higher 
for activist funds, re-
quest of board seats, 
share buybacks, oppos-
ing a merger/planning 
to induce one 
Positive abnormal 
returns over one year 
for activist HF 
Comparison of active and passive targets: active 
have better operating profitability, lower market-
to-book, no indication for free cash flow problems 
Operating performance increases, 
mainly due to divestment of underper-




U.S.  1994 – 
2005 
Positive abnormal re-




Small targets, poor prior stock performance, low 
growth opportunities, sound operating perform-
ance, large cash, low dividend yield and payout 
ratio, low R&D 
Increase in Tobin’s q (decline in un-
dervaluation), reduction in cash hold-




U.S.  1993 – 
2006 
Positive returns for the 
announcement of asset 
sales and induction of 
takeover 
Large returns is the 
target is ultimately 
take over by another 
firm 
More likely acquisition targets, smaller, less ana-
lyst coverage and poor prior stock performance 




U.S.  2003 – 
2005 
Controlling for the 
specific request, there is 
no significant differ-




Sound operating profitability, high cash  Increase in dividend and leverage, 








Positive effects, higher 
abnormal returns com-




related to size 
Active HF investments: large and liquid targets  Increase in systematic risk 
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Table 3: Overview PE literature 
Authors  Region  Horizon  Short term event study  Premia  Target characteristics 
Lehn and Poulson 
(1989) 
U.S.  1980 – 
1987 
NA  Premia positively depend on cash rich-
ness and low managerial equity 
Low growth, cash richness and prior takeover 
target 
Opler and Titman 
(1993) 
U.S.  1979 – 
1989 
NA  NA  Combination of low growth prospects and high 
cash flows, low expected financial distress 
costs as proxied for by R&D, high degree of 
diversification 
Halpern et al. (1999)  U.S.  1981 – 
1986 
NA  For very little management ownership 
premia are inversely related to prior 
stock performance 
Non-management led LBO targets receive 
greater prior acquisition interest, poor prior 
stock performance, low debt to equity ratio 
and low managerial equity 
Weir et al. (2005b)  UK  1998 – 
2000 
NA  NA  Higher CEO ownership, lower prospects, less 
duality with respect to identity of CEO and 
chairman 
Weir et al. (2008)  UK  1998 – 
2001 
NA  NA  More diversified, high asset collateralization, 
poor prior stock performance, quoted for 
shorter period of time, small size 
Renneboog et al. 
(2007) 
UK  1997 – 
2003 
Positive abnormal returns driven by 
prior stock performance, low lever-
age low managerial equity 
Premia driven by prior stock perform-
ance, low leverage, low managerial 
equity 
NA 
Andres et al. (2007)  Europe  1997 – 
2005 
Positive abnormal returns driven by 
free float, managerial inefficiency 
and undervaluation; drivers on a 
macro level: poor protection of 
minority shareholders 
NA  NA 
Achleitner et al. 
(2009) 
Germany  1998 - 
2007 
Positive reaction driven by under-
valuation, little actual use of lever-
age and the size of tax payments 
NA  NA 26 
 
Table 4: Summary of hypotheses 
 
 
Hypothesis  Variable  Expected sign 
Free cash flow  Cash  Pos. 
  Debt  Neg. 
  Dividend yield  Neg. 
  Tobin's Q  Neg. 
  Research and development  Neg. 
Ownership structure  Management ownership  Neg. 
  Family ownership  Neg. 
  Free float  Neg. 
  Private benefits  Pos. 
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Table 5: Industry distribution 
The table below shows the distribution of target and control firms across industries. The industry Classification is 
obtained from Deutsche Börse. 
  HF  PE  Control 
Industry  #  in %  #  in %  #  in % 
Consumer goods  6  6.3%  13  22.8%  9  9.4% 
Media  13  13.5%  5  8.8%  8  8.3% 
Industriais  27  28.1%  12  21.1%  18  18.8% 
Pharma & Healthcare  10  10.4%  3  5.3%  9  9.4% 
Telecommunication  4  4.2%  3  5.3%  2  2.1% 
Technology  8  8.3%  2  3.5%  8  8.3% 
Software  15  15.6%  9  15.8%  15  15.6% 
Utilities  0  0.0%  1  1.8%  3  3.1% 
Chemicals  5  5.2%  2  3.5%  3  3.1% 
Construction  1  1.0%  1  1.8%  3  3.1% 
Automobile  2  2.1%  6  10.5%  4  4.2% 
Basic resources  0  0.0%  0  0.0%  5  5.2% 
Retail  3  3.1%  0  0.0%  5  5.2% 
Transportation & Logistics  2  2.1%  0  0.0%  4  4.2% 
N  96    57    96   
 
Table 6: Distribution of entries over time 
The table below summarizes the entry dates of HF and PE targtes. The years for which data on the control sample 
is collected were randomly drawn from the entry dates of HF and PE. 
  HF  PE  Control 
Year  #  in %  #  in %  #  in % 
1998  0  0.0%  1  1.8%  1  1.0% 
1999  0  0.0%  3  5.3%  3  3.1% 
2000  0  0.0%  8  14.0%  5  5.2% 
2001  1  1.0%  2  3.5%  0  0.0% 
2002  1  1.0%  3  5.3%  3  3.1% 
2003  2  2.1%  9  15.8%  11  11.5% 
2004  6  6.3%  6  10.5%  10  10.4% 
2005  19  19.8%  13  22.8%  24  25.0% 
2006  28  29.2%  9  15.8%  20  20.8% 
2007  39  40.6%  3  5.3%  19  19.8% 
N  96    57    96   
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Table 7: Stake sizes 
The table shows the summary statistics on the stakes acquired by HF and PE. The stake size in % refers to the 
maximum stake which has been held over the time horizon under consideration. The euro volume is calculated as 
the maximum stake size multiplied by the market value of equity 20 trading days before the entry of the investor. 
Minority stake is defined as a stake smaller than 25% and a Controlling stake is defined as stake greater than 
25%. If an investor acquires a stake greater than 30%, he is obliged to make a public offer to the remaining 
shareholders which is why we include Information on this threshold. 
  HF  PE 
In EUR million     
Average stake size  22.6  151.2 
Median stake size  7.9  44.5 
Standard deviation  35.9  241.3 
In %     
Average stake size  8.2  71.6 
Median stake size  5.6  82.3 
Standard deviation  6.1  30.7 
Stake type     
Minority stake  95.8%  8.8% 
Controlling stake  4.2%  91.2% 
Stake over 30%  0.0%  80.7% 
Stake over 75%  0.0%  54.4% 
Delisting  8.3%  47.4% 29 
 
Table 8: Summary statistics 
The Table shows the summary statistics. All figures are indicated in %. Free float is defined as the sum of shareholdings below 5%. Family is defined as the stake in held by fami-
ly members who are neither members of the executive board themselves nor related to them. Management denotes the stake that is held by members of the management board. 
The Private benefits dummy is set to 1 if the largest shareholder holds more than 25% and the second-largest holds less than 5%. Acquisition (target) refer to rumors that the firm 
plans an acquisition (is subjected to takeover speculation). Executed acquisition refers to the firm having executed an acquisition during two years before the entry. Size in terms 
of market value refers to the value of equity, size in terms of sales to the annual volume of sales. Risk denotes the standard deviation of returns over 250 trading days up to 20 days 
until the entry. Prior stock performance is defined the market adjusted share price to 20 trading days before entry divided by the market adjusted average share price of the ante-
ceding 250 days. Q is defined as (market value of equity + book value of total liabilities)/total assets divided by the equivalent measure of the average of all firms in DAX and 
MDAX in the respective year. Net debt is (short term debt + long term debt – cash and cash equivalents)/total assets. Cash denotes cash and cash equivalents scaled by sales. Div-
idend yield is defined as the cash dividend scaled by the market value of equity. Research (dummy) is set to 1 if the firm expenses and development, 0 otherwise. Tax denotes tax 
expenses scaled by the sales. The columns under difference in means indicates the difference of HF targets, PE targets to control firms and HF to PE targets. We perform t-tests 
for the significance of the difference (Pearson’s chi square tests for dummies). *,** and *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level. The data have been 
winsorized at the 3% level. 
  Mean  Median  Standard deviation  Difference in means 
In %  HF  PE  Control  HF  PE  Control  HF  PE  Control  HF  PE  HF vs. PE 
Free float  58.01  43.20  47.13  56.20  42.00  48.64  24.59  27.04  22.69  10.89***  -3.93  14.82*** 
Family  3.54  15.84  13.12  0.00  0.00  0.00  7.70  25.43  23.37  -9.58***  2.72  -12.30*** 
Management  7.98  4.06  11.78  0.00  0.00  0.00  16.78  11.68  21.01  -3.80  -7.72***  3.92* 
Private benefits (d)  33.33  57.89  52.08  0.00  100.00  100.00  47.39  49.81  50.22  -18.75***  5.81  -24.56*** 
Acquisition (d)  35.42  15.79  28.13  0.00  0.00  0.00  .4808  36.79  45.20  7.29  -12.34*  19.63*** 
Target (d)  22.92  28.07  4.17  0.00  0.00  0.00  42.25  45.33  20.09  18.75***  23.9***  -5.15 
Size (MV) in EUR m  130.73  84.09  95.27  121.24  56.00  61.01  0.00  0.00  0.01  35.46  -11.18  46.63* 
Size (sales) in EUR m  159.21  248.21  163.50  143.12  248.05  120.52  0.01  0.00  0.01  -4.29  84.71  -89* 
Risk %  2.79  2.66  3.18  2.55  2.41  2.71  0.96  0.95  1.66  -0.39**  -0.52**  0.13 
Prior stock performance in %  99.89  102.20  98.66  96.97  101.33  96.29  19.31  17.01  24.00  1.23  3.54  -2.31 
Q adjusted  109.47  78.90  89.40  89.32  72.90  77.42  52.50  27.19  41.64  20.06***  -10.51*  30.57*** 
Debt  22.29  20.68  18.61  18.30  18.31  18.78  18.55  18.77  16.71  3.68  2.07  1.61 
Net debt  3.85  8.26  1.10  7.02  8.58  5.30  32.44  28.78  29.90  2.75  7.16  -4.41 30 
 
  Mean  Median  Standard deviation  Difference in means 
Cash  13.93  10.38  13.38  10.83  7.06  8.08  12.37  11.37  13.32  0.55  -2.99  3.55* 
Dividend yield  0.88  2.43  2.12  0.00  1.25  0.02  1.42  4.92  4.06  -1.24***  0.30  -1.55** 
Research (d)  50.00  24.56  35.42  50.00  0.00  0.00  50.26  43.43  48.08  14.58**  -10.86  25.44*** 
Tax  2.46  1.90  2.29  1.59  1.01  1.75  2.63  2.23  2.34  -0.39  -0.39  0.56 
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Table 9: Spearman correlations 
The following table shows the Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients of the variables. * denotes significant correlation at the 10% level. The data have been winsorized at the 
3% level. 
 
  Variable  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15 
1  Fam  1.00                             
2  Mgmt  -0.16*  1.00                           
3  Free 
float 
-0.15*  -0.03  1.00                         
4  PB (d)  -0.05  0.02  -0.29*  1.00                       
5  R&D  0.08  -0.03  0.14*  0.02  1.00                     
6  Risk  0.02  0.19*  0.09  0.00  -0.12*  1.00                   
7  Perf  0.13*  -0.07  -0.12*  -0.05  0.03  -0.11*  1.00                 
8  Size  0.00  -0.26*  -0.04  -0.01  0.06  -0.57*  0.22*  1.00               
9  Q  -0.08  0.04  0.04  -0.03  0.12*  -0.05  -0.14*  -0.16*  1.00             
10  Cash  -0.01  0.07  0.15*  -0.02  0.09  0.24*  -0.01  -0.37*  0.22*  1.00           
11  Debt  0.07  -0.12*  0.06  -0.08  -0.03  -0.07  -0.10  0.29*  -0.18*  -0.46*  1.00         
12  Dvd  0.06  -0.09  -0.14*  0.12*  0.06  -0.60*  0.15*  0.55*  -0.15*  -0.24*  0.01  1.00       
13  Tax  0.03  0.02  0.01  0.00  0.14*  -0.19*  0.24*  0.16*  0.17*  0.06  -0.19*  0.21*  1.00     
14  Acq (d)  0.11*  -0.07  0.15*  -0.05  0.17*  -0.25*  0.01  0.28*  -0.05  -0.07  0.01  0.19*  0.04  1.00   
15  Tar (d)  -0.10  -0.16*  -0.15  0.03  -0.07  -0.18*  0.24*  0.20*  -0.01  -0.04  -0.07  0.05  0.01  -0.09  1.00 
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Table 10: Binomial logistic regression – HF targets versus non-targets 
The dependent variable is set to 1 for HF targets and 0 for non-targets. The data have been winsorized at the 3% 
level. χ2 denotes the value for the likelihood chi square. z denotes the value for the z-statistics. *, ** and *** 
denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.  
 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Variable  Coef.  z  Coef.  z  Coef.  z 
Family  -0.05  -3.44***  -0.42  -2.91***  -0.39  -2.47*** 
Management  -0.01  -1.44  -0.13  -1.43  -0.01  -0.58 
Private benefits  -0.89  -2.62***         
Cash  1.40  0.8  0.14  0.08  0.03  0.02 
Net debt  1.24  1.7*  1.06  1.45  1.28  1.66* 
Tobin’s Q  0.96  2.54**  0.90  2.38**  1.21  2.83*** 
Research  0.81  2.38**  0.66  1.94**  0.67  1.86* 
Free float      0.12  1.69*  0.02  2.12** 
Dividend yield      -20.62  -2.17**  -23.16  -1.94** 
Size          -0.04  -0.37 
Prior stock performance          0.89  1.06 
Acquisition rumours          0.75  1.79* 
Takeover rumours          2.05  3.22*** 
Intercept  -0.68  -1.37  -1.18  -1.83*  -2.69  -1.85* 
Number of observations  192  192  192 
χ
2  41.82***  43.48***  62.57*** 
Pseudo R
2  0.16  0.16  0.24 
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Table 11: Binomial logistic regression – PE targets versus non-targets 
The dependent variable is set to 1 for PE targets and 0 for non-targets. Model 2 tests for a subsample of PE tar-
gets and only includes those targets where PE do not purchase their stake from the largest shareholder, as in this 
case, private benefits are unlikely. The data have been winsorized at the 3% level. χ2 denotes the value for the 
likelihood chi square. z denotes the value for the z-statistics. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% level.  
 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
  Coef.  z  Coef.  z  Coef.  z 
Family  0.00  0.51  0.00  0.1  0.00  0.07 
Management  -0.27  -2.15**  -0.03  -1.76*  -0.03  -2.28** 
Private benefits  0.25  0.7  -0.57  1.41     
Cash  -0.86  -0.4  -0.70  -0.29  -0.63  -0.27 
Net debt  0.37  0.42  0.19  0.18  0.77  0.81 
Tobin’s Q  -0.62  -1.15  -0.98  -1.48  -0.78  -1.24 
Research  -7.95  -1.76*  -8.21  -1.58*  -8.34  -1.81* 
Size          -0.19  -1.62 
Prior stock performance          0.74  0.79 
Risk          -36.91  -2.09** 
Tax          4.44  1.16 
Freefloat          -0.00  -0.34 
Intercept  0.60  0.44  0.59  0.89  3.13  1.53 
Number of observations  153  135  153 
χ2  15.25**  13.92*  22.14** 
Pseudo R2  0.08  0.09  0.12 
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Table 12: Summary of results 
Hypothesis  Variable  HF targets  PE targets 
Free cash flow  Cash  -  - 
  Debt  -  - 
  Dividends  Low  - 
  Tobin‘s Q  High  - 
  Research and development  High  Low 
Ownership structure  Management ownership  -  Low 
  Family ownership  High  - 
  Free float  High  - 
  Private benefits  -  - 
 